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Notes
Mercantile Credit Reports as Evidence
Most courts exclude mercantile credit reports from evi-
dence with the generalization that they are hearsay and
hence inadmissible. This Note examines the various prob-
lems involved in using such credit reports in evidence. The
author points out that the hearsay objection can often be
overcome when the problem is recognized as one of "double
hearsay." He concludes that even where a strict application
of the hearsay rule would bar the evidentiary use of these
reports, they should be admitted into evidence in particular
cases as "business records" when the trial court finds that a
given report meets the standards of reliability imposed by
the "business records" exception to the hearsay rule.
In the modem commercial world the need for reliable and accur-
ate credit information has been met to a large extent by mercantile
credit agencies which collect, compile, and furnish information to
businessmen which will be helpful to them in determining the credit
risk of a prospective debtor.' This credit information, disseminated
in the form of mercantile credit reports, may also be useful as evi-
dence in proving disputed facts in litigation.2 However, such credit
1. On mercantile agencies generally, see 36 Am. JuR., Mercantile Agencies (1941);
BECK N', Cranrrs & COLLECTIONS IN THEORY AND PRAcTicE 155-214 (4th ed.
1939); FOULER, THE SnEWs OF AmERICAN Comnmnm=E 275-379 (1941); IRONS &
BELxmOfE, Cointmc.L Cnaurr AND COLI0=TON PRACTICE 79-123 (2d ed. 1957);
AmEmCAN FjnANcL INsYrrUToNs 605-38 (Prochnow ed. 1951); Snuvrz & Prnm-
EARDT, CRnErr AND CoLI naoN MANAGEMENT 55-104 (2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter
cited by authors' or editors' names]. The need for credit information is illustrated
by the fact that nearly 90% of all manufacturers' and wholesalers' sales today are
based on credit. SHuLTZ & RmNHAnuT 3. Mercantile credit agencies have enjoyed a
continuous growth since their inception in 1841, IRONS & BELLEMoRE 80, and have
developed into large institutions which provide a steady flow of credit information
on virtually every kind of commercial operation. FOuLxE 303.
2. Credit reports would seem especially useful as evidence when the reputation for
financial standing of a business or person is in issue, since this fact seems less capable
of proof by means other than a credit report than are other kinds of information
in the report. See notes 27--33 infra and accompanying text. In addition to an
appraisal of credit strength, credit reports contain a variety of information which
may be relevant in litigation such as the history of a firm and its personnel, methods
of operation, physical facilities, and financial reports. This information may be
obtained from many different sources, making the credit report a composite of a
variety of information. Compare the discussion of the use in evidence of accountants'
summaries at note 69 infra. When specific facts such as a person's net worth or
ownership of property are in issue, a credit report may be the only available evi-
dence. See Brown v. Caylor, 144 Ga. 302, 87 S.E. 295 (1915); Blake v. Meadows,
225 Mo. 1, 123 S.W. 868 (1909).
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reports are usually excluded from evidence when offered to prove
the truth of the facts contained in the reports, 3 although they may
be admissible for various non-hearsay purposes.4 The purpose of this
Note is to (1) examine the methods credit agencies use in compiling
and reporting credit information; (2) consider the extent to which
the use of credit reports in evidence is limited by the hearsay rule;
and (3) determine whether a strict application of this rule should be
relaxed to permit a greater evidentiary use of these reports.
I. Tim COLLECTION AND RIEPOT=G OF CRmrr INFORMATION
The primary source of credit information is usually the business
whose credit standing is being investigated.5 Outside sources of in-
formation - public records, banks, merchandise suppliers, and others
who have dealt with the business in question - are utilized in sup-
plementing and verifying the information obtained from the primary
source.' This "outside" information may be derived from business
records, such as creditor's ledgers.7 However, the extent to which
regularly-kept records or only the informant's word are relied on will
vary from case to case.
Several types of reporters are employed by credit agencies.8 Dun
& Bradstreet "city" and "resident" reporters are usually trained spe-
3. E.g., Young's Market Co. v. Lane, 60 Ariz. 512, 141 P.2d 522 (1943); Brown
v. Caylor, 144 Ga. 302, 87 S.E. 295 (1915). See 36 Am. Jun., Mercantile Agencies
§ 4 (1941).
4. For example, in Crossier v. McNeal, 60 Ohio C.C. Dec. 748, 17 Ohio C.C.R.
644 (8th Cir. 1885), a credit report was admitted on the question whether a sub-
scriber had notice of the facts contained in the report. Credit reports are admissible
as evidence of falsely representing financial standing to a credit agency. Apparently,
the rationale is that evidence of the representation is not hearsay for this purpose,
but constitutes "operative facts." See, e.g., Ernest v. Cohen, 62 S.W. 186 (Tenn. App.
1900). A credit report might also be used to refresh a witness' memory. See Triplett
v. Rugby Distilling Co., 66 Ark. 219, 49 S.W. 975 (1899). In Trainor v. Buchanan
Coal Co., 154 Minn. 204, 191 N.W. 431 (1923), a credit report showing a buyer's
poor financial condition was admitted to show seller's good faith in relying on the
report when he revoked buyer's credit. Accord, Texas Employees Ins. Ass'n. v.
McDonald, 238 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
5. Fou=n 337.
6. "An effort is made to investigate every statement ... [obtained from the party
being investigated] . . .and to check every item . .. through inquiries made of
bankers, merchants, and other members of the community." BE:can. 167. Also-
see FouLiE 337.
7. For example, "outside" credit information obtained by Retail Credit Company,
a special-line mercantile agency, is confirmed through records whenever possible.
PRocaNrow 629.
8. Increased specialization and departmentalization by credit agencies have pro-
duced trained specialists who achieve a high degree of competence in collecting,
compiling, analyzing, and reporting credit information. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., has
a number of departments, each of which provides special reporting services. The
Credit Report Department investigates, analyzes, and publishes credit reports on
virtually every kind of business concern. The Insurance Division of this department
publishes special reports for fire insurance underwriters and agencies. The Reference
Book Department prepares a credit rating book. The Advisory Service Department
720
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cialists in the particular commercial fields which they investigate. 9
Reporters for National Credit Office, Inc., a special-line mercantile
agency, work exclusively on a particular group of firms within a spe-
cific industry.10 Dun & Bradstreet local correspondents are usually
businessmen in non-metropolitan areas who devote a part of their
time to credit investigating." These local correspondents do not
have the opportunity to achieve the degree of expertness which a
full-time specialist can attain; however, the fact that they often
cover the same trade area over a long period of time provides the
advantage of familiarity with local sources of information and trade
conditions."s
The various means employed by credit agencies in communicating
credit information to subscribers range from credit ratings, which
express a general evaluation of a business concern's credit strength,"1
to extensive credit reports. 14 Credit ratings, such as Dun & Brad-
street Reference Book Ratings, estimate credit strength in terms of
"high," "good," "fair," or "limited." 5 These ratings are determined
by two principal criteria-estimated financial strength, which is
supplies specialized information to garment manufacturers. Other special departments
provide information relating to specific subjects such as foreign businesses and politi-
cal entities - states, counties, municipalities, and similar borrowing units for investors.
There are also departments which collect past-due accounts, publish Dun's Review,
a business monthly, and make statistical studies on various problems affecting indus-
try, banking, accountancy, and review congressional legislation affecting business.
Four.z 802-03.
9. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., employs approximately 2,000 reporters who receive
special training in one of more than thirty types of business operations. INoNs &
BELLENiOE 99.
Dun & Bradstreet reporters are classified as City Reporters, Resident Reporters,
Local Correspondents, and Traveling Reporters. The City Reporter concentrates on
large corporate concerns, and investigates in only one particular field such as large
department stores or chemical manufacturers. He may further specialize by working
in only one geographical area in a large city, thus becoming thoroughly familiar
with the businessmen and firms in a particular area. The work of a Resident Reporter
is much the same as a City Reporter, except that the Resident Reporter does not
edit the report himself. He devotes his time to gathering credit information which
is edited in the central office by specialists in the particular field of the business
being investigated. Traveling Reporters make periodic investigations in a certain
geographical area so that each business can be investigated at least once a year.
PnocHNow 606-07.
The specialization of credit reporters may take unusual and varied forms. For
example, a credit reporter may be an expert in the fish or lumber industry, or may
spedaize in businesses in China Town in San Francisco, or in resort towns. See
FouIxE 341-47.
10. IRONs & BE.LENMorm 104. Special-line agencies report on either a particular
business, a limited territory, or give credit information of a special type, such as
ledger information of creditors of the person or business being investigated. See id.
at 103-22.
11. FoUraE 309.
12. BECKMi.A 167.
13. See IRONs & BELxOEmoR 85-89; SHtrLTz & REnLuw 60-64.
14. See IRONs & BErEMoRm 89--98; Sntmj & RB.mzAmUz 64-74.
15. IRoNs & BzrmO=.r 87.
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usually measured by tangible net worth,16 and a composite credit ap-
praisal, which is the agency's subjective determination based on a
number of factors.
Credit reports, unlike credit ratings, contain supporting factual
data in addition to the agency's analysis of these facts so that the
subscriber can draw his own conclusions.' For example, Dun &
Bradstreet Analytical Reports typically include information about
the personnel of the business, its history, method of operation, sub-
sidiaries, financial condition, paying record, and bank relations.19
The financial sections of these reports contain the latest available
financial statements of the business investigated.0
Despite their reluctance to admit credit reports into evidence,2'
courts are not unaware of the high reputation these reports have
among businessmen and the extent to which they are relied on in
important business transactions.22 Numerous credit agencies com-
16. Stmn & RanmAnir 60.
17. The composite credit appraisal expresses "the degree with which the following
eight conditions are met in the appraised business: (1) soundness of its legal struc-
ture; (2) sufficient age . . .; (3) capacity and experience of the management; (4)
no record of criticized failures or fires; (5) willingness to submit financial statements;
(6) sound financial position; (7) favorable financial and business trends; and (8)
good payment record." Id. at 63.
18. Id. at,64-65.
19. [Dun & Bradstreet] analytical reports are written by highly trained and
specialized reporters on the larger and more complicated business enterprises.
.. . The information presented in such reports is presented under seven cap-
tions: . . . Under the "Personnel" caption is given a brief description of the
background and business career of each officer or partner and the capacity in
which he serves the business. The development of the business from the inception
down to the present time is traced under the "History" caption. Included under
"Method of Operation" are such subjects as the products sold or manufactured,
the trade to which distribution is made, sales territory, number of accounts,
selling terms, number of salesmen, seasonal aspects of the business, number of
employees, facilities, and location.
The "Subsidiaries" presentation . . . gives the name and location of the
subject company's subsidiaries, the percentage of stock ownership by the parent
company, and other important information referring to the intercompany rela-
tionships. The "Financial Information" section presents the companies financial
statements in comparative form for the latest three years, including such oper-
ating details as net sales, net profits and dividends or withdrawals.. . . The
"Trade Investigation p resents the paying record of the business as reflected by a
tabulation of supplier ledger experiences. The "Bank Relations" section outlines
the nature and scope of the company's position with its depositories.
Ibid.
Analytical reports also contain ratings similar to those found in Dun & Bradstreet
Reference Books. IRONS & Br.r monE 91.
20. Ibid. Very often these financial statements are reproduced by photographic
processes, thus avoiding possible errors in reproduction. Id. at 100.
21. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
22. As early as 1889, a court recognized that "[credit] agencies have become
almost a necessity in the transaction of commercial business, and the rules by which
they are governed, and the information they gather . . . are well known to business
and commercial men generally, and such information is perhaps more frequently
relied upon among such men than that obtained from all other sources, and courts
cannot shut their eyes to these facts. ... Mooney v. Davis, 75 Mich. 188, 192, 42
pete with one another in the business of furnishing credit informa-
tion 2 3 a fact which naturally tends to encourage the development
of more accurate and reliable credit reporting. There is every
reason to believe that credit agencies are completely disinterested
and act at all times with honesty and objectivity in publishing credit
information:
The agency has every possible motive to be accurate. For obvious reasons
its only motive is to convey as nearly as possible the whole truth in every
report. If a report should exaggerate the worthiness of a risk and thus
induce subscribers to trust this risk more than is warranted, losses to the
subscriber would result. Should the report be too unfavorable, then sub-
scribers might deny credit to a good customer and thus lose business. In
either case the subscriber would blame .. . [the agencyl. 24
However, the accuracy and reliability of credit reports will depend
in each case on such factors as the skill of the particular reporter, the
sources of information available, and the cooperation given by those
persons from whom information is sought.
II. GCEnrr REPORTS AND TH HEARsAY RULE
A. The Problem: Hearsay and Double Hearsay
A hearsay problem will invariably arise in connection with the
evidentiary use of credit reports. Since the information gathered by
the credit reporter is obtained from out-of-court informants, an at-
tempt to prove the truth of this information by the reporter's testi-
mony will involve the introduction of hearsay evidence. And, when
the report is offered in place of the reporter's testimony, a "double
hearsay" 25 problem arises because the report itself is hearsay based
on the reporter's statements. This problem exists even when the
report is not offered to prove the truth of its contents, but for a
non-hearsay purpose such as proving a misrepresentation 2 6 of finan-
N.W. 802, 803 (1889). In Pump-It, Inc. v. Alexander, 230 Minn. 564, 570, 42 N.W.
2d 337, 340 (1950), the court said "there is no apparent reason why a disinterested
representative of a reputable commercial agency should misrepresent or color the
truth. The salability of his employer's service and his position depend upon the
accuracy of the reports. These reports are compiled by a regular procedure and
enjoy a good reputation in the business community.
23. There are about one hundred credit agencies in New York City besides Dun
& Bradstreet and an unknown number of them throughout the rest of the United
States. SHuLTz & Rmxnrwv 76.
24. InoNs & Br.T_ ionE 98-99.
25. On double hearsay generally, see McCoMcxmm, EvmENcE § 225 at 461 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McComafcK].
26. Evidence of a misrepresentation is admissible under the "operative facts"
doctrine. "Operative facts," as labeled by McCormick, or "utterances forming a part
of the issue," as characterized by Wigmore, are not excluded by the hearsay rule.
The rule is stated by Wigmore: "Where the utterance of specific words is itself a
part of the details of the issue under the substance law and the pleadings, their
utterance may be proved without violation of the Hearsay rule, because they are not
offered to evidence the truth of the matter that may be asserted therein." 6 WIGMMoE,
EvmENcE § 1770 at 185 (3rd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WimomE]. See McCoR-
i-cx § 228 at 463-64.
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cial condition to a credit agency. Though there is no "first step"
hearsAy problem here, the use of the report in evidence requires the
introduction of hearsay at the "second step" level; the report is being
offered to prove the truth of the reporter's out-of-court statement
that a given representation was made to him.
The "first step" of the double hearsay problem must be resolved
by showing that the credit reporter could properly testify as to mat-
ters contained in the report -either because an exception to the
hearsay rule applies or because the report is not offered for a hear-
say purpose. And, the "second" step of the double hearsay objection
must be met with a separate hearsay exception, such as the business
records exception, which will allow substitution of the report for
the reporter's testimony.
B. Resolving the First Step of the Double Hearsay Problem
In meeting the first step of the double hearsay objection by show-
ing that the credit reporter could properly testify as to the contents
of the report, the reputation, admissions, and declaration against
interest exceptions to the hearsay rule seem especially applicable.
I. Reputation evidence. When financial standing, solvency, or
wealth are in issue, the most useful hearsay exception as applied to
credit reports will be the reputation exception, which allows the
financial standing and solvency of a person or business to be proved
by evidence of general reputation in the business community. 7 The
witness must confine his testimony to his knowledge of general repu-
tation, and may not give his personal opinion as to financial standing
or solvency. 2
8
Reputation evidence is in reality no different from information
contained in a credit report which is gathered by a reporter from
persons in a business community who have knowledge of facts re-
lating to the solvency or financial standing of a person or business.
27. E.g., Lucas v. Swan, 67 F.2d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1933) (dictum); Hahn v.
Penny, 60 Minn. 487, 62 N.W. 1129 (1895); McCorNMcK § 298 st 625; 5 WIGmoRE
§ 1623. Contra, Coleman v. Lewis, 183 Mass. 485, 67 N.E. 603 (1903). The practice
of using reputation evidence "harks back to a time when jurors looked to neighbor-
hood repute, rather than to testimony in court, as their source of knowledge, and
long antedates the hearsay rule itself." McCoaNucK § 299 at 624. When the hearsay
rule evolved in the late seventeenth century, the use of reputation evidence was so
firmly established that an exception to the hearsay rule was recognized for this kind
of evidence to prove certain kinds of facts. Id. at § 228 at 469-70.
In some jurisdictions, other facts likely to be found in a credit report are provable
by evidence of reputation in the community: ownership or title, 5 WIGMoBE § 1626;
incorporation, id. at § 1625. The reputation exception is not limited to proving repu-
tation in the community in which one lives, but extends to a commercial community.
Id. at § 1616.
28. E.g., Lucas v. Swan, supra note 27; Hayes v. Wells & Babbit, 34 Md. 512
(1871). See 5 WiGMORE § 1584 (the testimony must relate to reputation, it must not
be an individual assertion); id. at 1591 (witness must have first-hand knowledge of
reputation).
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Because the credit reporter, by way of the credit report, relates the
same kind of information as does the reputation witness, the finan-
cial information contained in credit reports should be admissible as
reputation evidence to the extent that it is obtained from sources of
information other than the business to which the records relate. The
testimony of a member of the community regarding one's financial
reputation is not likely to be as reliable a reflection of the opinion
held by the business community as the findings of a credit reporter
whose job it is to collect and report this kind of information. The
methods used by credit agencies in collecting and compiling credit
information are far more scientific than the means whereby an indi-
vidual obtains knowledge of a person's general financial reputation.
Of course, a credit report will not be admissible under the reputa-
tion exception to prove specific facts in a report, but only to the
extent that it reflects general reputation in the community.2 9
Though no case has squarely held that credit reports are admis-
sible as evidence of financial standing, in Perper v. Edell,3" the
Florida Supreme Court appeared to apply the reputation rationale.
There a real estate agent brought suit for commissions allegedly due
for procuring a purchaser for defendant's hotel. On the issue
whether plaintiff had procured a purchaser who was willing and.
financially able to buy the hotel, the court held that the testimony
of a representative of a credit agency relating to the financial respon-
sibility of the purchaser should have been received over the hear-
say objection. The court did not state the precise ground for its
holding, but the reputation exception clearly seems to apply to the
admission of this credit information to prove financial responsibil-
ity,31 and thus to satisfy the "first step" hearsay objection. And, the
court's language that "evidence based on the financial responsibility
29. See 5 WiGMORE § 1585.
As will be seen below, the business records exception is an adequate answer to
the second step of the double hearsay objection- use of the credit report in evi-
dence in place of the reporter's testimony. But beyond this, there is even less harm
in relying on the report when it is offered as reputation evidence, since lack of
opportunity to cross-examine is not a serious hardship in this situation. The testimony
of the reputation witness is not based on his personal knowledge of the facts he
relates, but only on his knowledge of the community belief as to these facts. He can
therefore be effectively cross-examined only as to the basis for his knowledge of
reputation in the community. When preliminary proof for admission in evidence of a
credit report is presented, there will be an adequate opportunity for this kind of
cross-examination. See notes 75-80 infra and accompanying text.
80. 160 Fla. 477, 35 So. 2d 387 (1948).
31. All the elements of the reputation exception were present: 1) The testimony
was hearsay since it was offered to prove the financial condition of the purchaser.
2) The testimony related to "financial responsibility and business standing," and was
therefore a fact properly provable by reputation evidence. 3) The credit information
was doubtless basedin part on sources other than the purchaser himself. See note 6
and accompanying text, supra. To this extent the information was based on the pur-
chaser's reputation in the business community.
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and business standing of a proposed purchaser is admissible," 3 2 indi-
cates that this exception was the probable basis for admitting this
evidence.3
2. Admissions of a party-opponent and declarations against inter-
est. The admissions of a party-opponent and declaration against
interest exceptions are also applicable in solving the first step of the
double hearsay problem that arises in connection with the evidenti-
ary use of credit reports. Since out-of-court statements of a party to
litigation are admissible in evidence as admissions of a party-
opponent,34 credit reports come within this exception to the extent
that they contain information obtained from a party. When the
credit information is obtained from a person who is not a party to
the litigation, the declarations against interest exception may be
available. An out-of-court statement is admissible under this excep-
tion if it was against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest
when made, and if the declarant is unavailable at the time of trial.3
This exception appears to be more applicable when the declarant
is the person whose credit rating is being investigated by the credit
32. 160 Fla. at 485, 35 So. 2d at 391. Mathews v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 153, 198
Pac. 112 (1921), is another case where the reputation exception was applicable. The
case was a criminal prosecution for obtaining money by false pretenses. On the
question whether a trust company had any assets and whether its commercial paper
had any value, the court admitted testimony of a bank examiner based on information
gathered from the books and records of the company and supplemented by informa-
tion obtained from banks and credit agencies. The court did not set forth the specific
ground for admission, but said, "It has been frequently held that the question of
the solvency of an individual, or of a corporation, in cases of this character involving
fraud, may be established by hearsay evidence." Id. at 166, 198 Pac. at 117. Insofar
as the bank examiner's testimony was based on "outside source' information con-
tained in the credit report, it would seem to come within the scope of the reputation
exception. And if oral testimony based on the report is admissible, surely the report
itself would be admissible.
33. The reputation witness in the Perper case was a representative of the credit
agency's Miami office who was relating information obtained from the agency's
Philadelphia office. Thus a double hearsay problem was involved. The reputation
exception satisfies only the "first step" objection; the court did not indicate that it
was treating the problem as one of double hearsay and did not specify a hearsay
exception with which to resolve the "second step" objection -substitution of the
Miami representative's testimony for that of the Philadelphia reporter who obtained
the information. It is likely that the information forwarded to the Miami office was
in the form of a written report, and, if so, it would seem that the report would have
been admissible under this holding since oral testimony based on such a report is an
even further step of hearsay. In fact, admission of this oral testimony seems to violate
the rule requiring the reputation witness to have first-hand knowledge of the com-
munity reputation. See note 28 supra. It will be seen at notes 37-51 infra, and
accompanying text that the business records exception would have justified admission
of the credit report in the Perper case.
34. See generally, McConaNcx §§ 239-52.
35. Id. at § 253. The requirement of unavailability may have a significant limiting
effect on the use of this exception. It has been strictly applied by many courts,
although it has been argued persuasively that it should be relaxed. Id. at § 257. Such
reasons as death, insanity, absence from the jurisdiction, or physical incapacity are
acceptable, but it is doubtful whether mere practical inconvenience would satisfy the
requirement. Ibid.
agency, rather than an outside source of credit information. In the
former situation the declarant is more likely to make statements
against his interest since he is furnishing information relating to his
own business and financial condition. On the other hand, in the
latter case the declarant furnishes information relating primarily to
the business and activities of another.
In resolving the first step of the double hearsay objection, it must
be remembered that a given exception will rarely ever apply to the
entire report. For example, the admissions exception will apply only
to that part of the report containing information obtained from a
party to litigation, while the reputation exception will have applica-
tion to parts of the report which are based on other sources. Thus,
two or more exceptions may be applied simultaneously to admit all
or part of a given report.
C. Resolving the Second Step of the Double Hearsay Objection-
The Business Records Exception
When the "first step" hearsay objection has been met, the "second
step" objection-which arises from substitution of the credit report
for the reporter's testimony- can be resolved by applying the busi-
ness records exception. The admission of regular business entries
into evidence is an established exception to the hearsay rule.3 6 The
basis for this exception is twofold: 1) most modem businesses use
systematic and regular procedures which produce accurate records
generally considered to be reliable and trustworthy; 2) the necessity
of relying on these out-of-court statements is justified by the undue
inconvenience and expense involved in presenting in court all per-
sons connected with the making of the record or who have first-hand
knowledge of the facts recorded.
Most states have statutory provisions governing the admission in
86. See generally, McCoanncn §§ 281-90. The modem business records exception
to the hearsay rule is derived from the old English "Shop Book" rule, which admitted
the shop books of businessmen as evidence of accounts due for sales or services
rendered. Id. at § 282. The rule now includes records of an "act . . . or event made
in the regular course of business." UNuonm BusniEss REcoRns As EvmENcE Acr § 2.
37. McComacm § 281. There are several requirements that the business record
must meet to be admissible under the common law rule: 1) The entry must be an
"original" entry, although this requirement is often relaxed where it is usual business
practice for transactions to be recorded on slips or memorandum books and later
recorded in a permanent record book. 2) The entry must be recorded within a short
time of the transaction. This requirement receives varied treatment from the courts
and often is not strictly enforced. 3) The first-hand knowledge requirement is no
longer strictly enforced because of the complexity of modem business. It is unneces-
sary that the recording clerk have first-hand knowledge of the facts recorded if they
are based on the report of one who knows the facts. 4) The regularity requirement
means that it must be in the regular course of business to recordf the iacts, but it is
not required that the recorded occurrance be one that happens often. 5) The neces-
sity requirement has now been relaxed so that only the inconvenience of presenting
the testimony of those who had a part in the recording process need be shown,
rather than requiring the unavailability of the entrant. Id. at §§ 283-88.
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evidence of business records." The Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act has been adopted in approximately half the states,39
while a few others have patterned statutes after the Model Act.40
The Uniform Act provides:
A record of an act, condition or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be com-
petent evidence if the custodian or other competent witness testifies as to
the identity and the mode of its preparation and if it was made in the
regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the source of information,
methods and time of preparation, were such as to justify its admission.4 1
The Model Act, after which is patterned the Federal Business
Records Act,42 admits business records made in the regular course
of business, and specifies that "All other circumstances of the mak-
ing of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge
by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they
shall not affect its admissibility. 4 3
Davis v. Louisville Trust Co.44 is the only case which has squarely
held that credit reports are admissible as business records. On the
question whether defendant corporation had misrepresented its
financial condition by furnishing false information to a credit agency
to induce the purchase of defendant's stock, the court approved the
admission of the resulting credit report as evidence of the misrepre-
sentation. Here there was no "first step" hearsay problem since the
report was introduced for the non-hearsay purpose of showing that
the representation was made.45 However, the defendant objected
88. See 6 WIMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1520, n.6 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1959).
39. UN Fo Busnmss REcoRDs AS EVIDENCE AcT § 2. For a compilation of states
that have adopted the Uniform Act, see 9A UsNmOi LAws ANN. 297.
40. The Model Act was drafted by a committee established under the Common-
wealth Fund and is set out in MORGAN, CnA&mE, GxvoaD, HiNToN, HOUGH, JoHN-
sTON, SuNDERLAND, WiGMORE, TnE LAW OF EVIDENCE, Somm PoposAls For ITs
REFoRm 63 (1927) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN]. For a compilation of states adopt-
ing the Model Act, see 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1520, n.6 (3d ed. 1940, Supp.
1959).
41. UNrFoum BusmEss RECORDS AS EVIDENCE AcT § 2.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
43. MonGu, 63. Professor McCormick has said that although this provision "could
be interpreted as abolishing the requirement of first hand knowledge by one whose
job it is to know the facts . . . the more reasonable interpretation" is that only the
entrant, and not the one whose job it is to report the information, is excused from
the first-hand knowledge requirement. McConNUcK § 286 at 602. However, this
statutory provision has been relied on by courts to admit business records which
would otherwise violate the hearsay rule and the personal knowledge requirement.
E.g., Kelly v. Wasserman, 5 N.Y.2d 425, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1959), dis-
cussed at note 68 infra and accompanying text; Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel
Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950), discussed at note 64 infra and accompanying text.
44. 181 Fed. 10 (6th Cir. 1910).
45. Since plaintiff's claim was based on defendant's false representations, evidence
of the representations was admissible as "operative facts," although this was not
discussed by the court. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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that the report itself was hearsay, being an out-of-court statement of
the reporter. Over this objection the court held the report admissible
as a business record, pointing out that the reporter was engaged in
the regular course of business, had a duty to record the information
contained in the report, and had no personal interest in the matter
recorded. The requirement of necessity was satisfied, since the re-
porter died prior to trial.
The business records exception seems clearly applicable to credit
reports in cases where, as in Davis, the reporter could properly tes-
tify as to the matters contained in the report either because the tes-
timony is not offered for a hearsay purpose or because a particular
hearsay exception applies.4" Since this "first step" hearsay problem
has already been resolved, the business records exception is not relied
on to justify admission of the reports for the purpose of proving the
truth of the information that they contain; it applies only at the
"second step" level to substitute the report for the reporter's other-
wise competent testimony."
Just as the recording methods of most modem businesses make
ordinary business records a reliable substitute for direct testimony
of the facts contained in the record 4 8 the efficient reporting and re-
cording methods of credit agencies make credit reports a reliable
substitute for the reporter's testimony. And, when the element of
necessity is present because of the undue inconvenience of requiring
the author of the report to testify,49 the requirements of the business
records exception are satisfied."0
III. LmEaizm TE HEARSAY RESTRIMCON ON Tim Evi'rmENIAY
USE OF CREDrr REPORTS
In determining the admissibility of credit reports, courts usually
exclude the reports with the generalization that they are inadmissi-
46. The requirement that a business record, to be admissible, be based on the
personal knowledge of the informant, would appear to be satisfied by virtue of the
fact that the credit reporter-the credit report's informant-is made competent
to testify because of an applicable hearsay exception.
47. In Baugh v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 307 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1957), the
court applied the double hearsay approach in admitting into evidence a hospital
record which was based upon hearsay statements. After stating that the business
records exception does not render admissible a statement which is "hearsay based
upon hearsay," the court found that the statement contained in the record was itself
admissible as an "admission against interest." Thus, the admissions exception cured
the "first step" hearsay objection and the hospital record was admissible as a
business record.
48. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
49. ibi.
50. The use in evidence of credit reports which contain facts obtained from other
documents will usually not run afoul of the "best evidence rule." This evidentiary
rule requires the "best evidence" to be presented in court when the terms of a
particular document are sought to be proved. However, credit reports will most
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ble hearsay without treating the problem as one of double hearsay.
It has been pointed out above that if this question is recognized as
a two-step hearsay problem, credit reports will often be admissible.
Nevertheless, a strict application of this technical hearsay doctrine
to credit reports may result in the exclusion of much reliable and
.trustworthy evidence. The third part of this Note examines whether
there is justification for admitting into evidence credit reports shoum
to be reliable even though the first step of the double hearsay objec-
tion has not been met.
A. Are Credit Reports Different From Normal Business Records?
In the typical modem business, the information contained in a
business record is obtained from one person and recorded by an-
other.52 The evidentiary use of normal business records, like credit
reports, therefore involves a "two-step" hearsay problem; the record
is based on the out-of-court statement of the entrant which in turn
is based on the out-of-court statement of the informant. Thus the
business record exception resolves both steps of the double hearsay
objection. Although the hearsay problems relating to both normal
business records and credit reports are conceptually similar, the for-
mer are admissible while the latter are generally excluded. The
question remains whether factual differences between these two
types of records justify this disparity of treatment.
The principal factor distinguishing credit reports from the internal
records of any other business is that in the latter case the source of
the information and the recorder are both within the same business
and are parts of one integrated system whereby facts relating to the
business are ascertained and recorded. Thus, a fact which is re-
corded can be traced back through the organization of the business,
can be verified and found to be based on the personal knowledge
of someone connected with the business whose job it was to know
and report the information.
However, in the case of credit reports, the informant is not asso-
ciated with the recording business; in fact, he may not even be
associated with the business to which his information relates. Thus,
the recording business - the credit agency - does not have within
its business organization a person having first hand knowledge of
the report's contents.
But on the other hand, credit information is often obtained from
informants who do have first-hand knowledge of the affairs of the
often be offered in evidence not for this purpose, but only to establish certain facts
which are recorded in another document on which the credit report is based. On the
"best evidence rule" generally, see McCoamcKx §§ 196-98.
51. See authorities cited note 8 supra.
52. See MORGAN 57-61.
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business to which the reports relate.53 In such a situation, the only
fact that distinguishes a credit report from any other business record
is that more than one business is involved. It does not follow that
for this reason a credit report fails to meet the standards of reliability
and trustworthiness that the business records exception was de-
signed to insure. When it is shown that the report was based on
the personal knowledge of someone connected with one business,
and was properly recorded in the regular course of the credit
agency's business, the principal safeguards underlying the business
records exception have been complied with: the informant had first-
hand knowledge of the matters recorded, and the information was
recorded in the regular course of business.54 But even though these
safeguards may be met, it must be determined whether the business
records exception properly encompasses records based on sources ot
information outside the recording business, or should be restricted
in its application to only "single business" records.
B. Can the Admission of Credit Reports be Justified Solely by the
Business Records Exception?
1. The Uniform Act and the Model Act. The business record ex-
ception, as codified by the Uniform Act and the Model Act, requires
preliminary proof that the record be made in the "regular course of
business." 55 However, these acts do not require that the person mak-
ing the record have personal knowledge -of the facts recorded.
Furthermore, they do not require that the "act or occurance"
recorded be an act or occurance of the recording business. These
acts express a liberal approach apparently designed to facilitate ex-
tensive use of business records in evidence. Thus, the Model Act
provides that the circumstances of the making of a regularly-entered
record, including personal knowledge, go only to weight and not
admissibility."6 And, the Uniform Act expressly leaves to the trial
judge's discretion the question whether the source of information
and the manner of preparation justify admission of the record. 57
This broad grant of discretion could be interpreted as permitting
the admission of business records, such as credit reports, which are
based on sources of information outside the recording business. Un-
der this interpretation, the fact that the informant and the recorder
are connected with different businesses is just one element for the
trial judge to consider, since the real question is whether the "source
of information, method and time of preparation, were such as to
53. See notes 6 & 7 supra and authorities cited therein.
54. See McCoPficx § 286.
55. See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
56. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
57. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
1960] NOTES
732 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:719
justify admission."5 Thus, the trial court would decide, on the basis
of the preliminary proof, whether a credit report is in fact unreliable
because it is not a "single business" record.59
2. Two illustrative cases. A significant number of cases have ex-
pressed a minority view that the business records exception is not
restricted to records in which the informant and entrant were both
associated with the same business.6 0 For example, the Minnesota
58. Ibid.
59. The Model Act and the Uniform Act are discussed in McCoanxcK § 289 at
607-09:
The Uniform Act . . . makes clear that non-commercial records are covered
and specifies that the record may be used to prove a "condition" which opens the
way for reports of diagnoses in hospital records. As to the burden of production
of participants and preliminary proof of unavailability of absent participants, the
Model Act undoubtedly is intended to dispense with these requirements by
omitting them and merely requiring that the trial judge shall find that the record
was made in regular course, etc. The Uniform Act is more satisfactorily specific
in its handling of this problem in providing that all the necessary preliminary
proof may be made "by the custodian or other qualified witness." Both acts fail
to give a clear answer to the question whether business records of information
furnished by one who has no business duty to give it are admissible in proof
of the facts so volunteered.
The Uniform Act in its last clause introduces the element of discretion of the
trial judge to admit or exclude the record according to his "opinion" as to
whether the sources of information, etc. were "such as to justify its admission."
This affords a flexibility which may be valuable in particular cases but it may be
questioned whether predictability of admission when certain fairly objective
standards for the offered record are met is not a more useful aim.
Id. at 608.
60. McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co., 198 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1952); Pekelis v.
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
951 (1951); Woodward v. United States, 185 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1950); Moran v.
Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950); Hunter v. Derby
Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940); Kelly v. Wasserman, 5 N.Y.2d 425, 185
N.Y.S.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1959). Cf. Central R.R. v. Jules S. Settnek Co., 258
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1958). In State Farm Mut. Automotive Ins. Co. v. West, 149 F.
Supp. 289, 299, n.9 (D. Md. 1957), the report of an insurance adjuster, containing
the adjuster's conclusions and based in part on the defendant's police record, was
held admissible under the business records exception. The court admitted the report
on the basis of the adjuster's testimony that he made written reports to his super-
visors in the regular course of business and that the reports were prepared near
the time of the act recorded.
Contra, Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 675 (1958): "The probability of trustworthiness of memoranda and records
made and maintained as provided in § 1732 [the federal business records act] lies
in the fact that they are the routine reflections of the day-to-day operations of the
business in whose files the memoranda and reports are found." In Johnson v. Lutz,
253 N.Y. 124, 128, 170 N.E. 517, 518 (1930), the court, in excluding a police
accident report which was not based on the personal knowledge of the reporting
offcer, said, "It [the business records exception] was not intended to permit the
receipt in evidence of entries based upon voluntary hearsay statements made by
third parties not engaged in the business or under any duty in relation thereto." Also,
see Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943), where the Court said, "Those
[accident] reports are not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad
business. Unlike payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading and
the like, these reports are calculated for use essentially in court, not in the business.
Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading."
In United States v. Martin, 167 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ill. 1957), credit reports were
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Supreme Court has said that records prepared by parties who are
strangers to the business to which the records relate come within the
business records exception, if it was in the regular course of business
to have the third party make the business entry.61 The most liberal
application of this minority view 6 2 has been in the area of official
government reports.
offered in evidence as business records of the subscriber companies to which the
reports were sent by the credit agency. The court did not answer the question
whether the reports would be admissible if offered as business records of the credit
agency. The reports were excluded because no one within the subscriber companies
could vouch for the trustworthiness of the reports. The court pointed out that "The
statute . . . [the federal business records act] . . does not cover records kept
which are outside the regular course of business," and held that "letters and reports
made by third persons, other than defendants [to whom the reports related] who are
neither employees or officers of . . . [the subscriber] . . . companies, are not busi-
ness records contemplated by the act." Id. at 302-03. Thus the records were inad-
missible because they were not prepared within the companies offering them in
evidence; the court did not decide the question whether the fact that the information
contained in the reports was based on an informant outside the recording business
rendered them inadmissible.
For a collection of cases in which "non-bookkeeping" entries have been admitted
under the business records exception, see Polasky & Paulson, Business Entries, 4 UTAH
L. REV. 327, 343-44, nn.90, 91 (1955).
61. Wilson v. Moline, 229 Minn. 154, 175-76, 38 N.W.2d 201, 208 (1949) (dic-
tum). This case involved accounting statements prepared by a third party and based
on the records of a partnership which were kept in an account book which one of
the partners used in connection with a different business. The court refused to admit
the records because they were not made in the regular course of business and were
not identified by the party under whose supervision they wexe compiled. In stating
that these third-party records would be admissible if made in the regular course of
business, the court was speaking in the context of the Minnesota account book
statute, MiNN. STAT.§ 600.05, and was not interpreting MINN. STAT. § 600.02, the
Minnesota business records statute which is patterned after the Uniform Act. How-
ever, the court derived support for this proposition from Tiedt v. Larson, 174 Minn.
558, 219 N.W. 905 (1928), and 7 DuNNEi's Mn'NESOTA DiczsT § 3346 (2d ed.
1927), and both of these authorities were interpreting the business records exception
codified by the Uniform Act which is applicable to business records generally.
In Pump-It, Inc. v. Alexander, 230 Minn. 564, 42 N.W.2d 337 (1950), the same
Minnesota court did not answer the question whether the Wilson reasoning applied
to credit reports. After stating that credit reports have usually been excluded when
offered to prove the facts contained therein, the court admitted a credit report
because its contents were proved by direct testimony. The court expressly declined
to answer the question whether the report would be admissible absent this supporting
testimony. Since the portions of the report sought to be introduced were based on
information obtained from the defendant, the double hearsay approach could have
been used. Thus, the admissions exception could have been applied to satisfy the
"first step" of the double hearsay objection, and the report could have been sub-
stituted for the reporter's testimony under the business records exception.
62. A majority of courts exclude written reports of government officials when they
contain hearsay or are not based on the author's first-hand knowledge. E.g., Kansas
City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, Inc., 250 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1952) (fire
chiefs report stating the cause of a fire and based on hearsay held inadmissible);
Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930) (report of a police officer
relating to the cause of an accident held inadmissible unless the officer witnessed
the accident). See McCoaIcK § 294 at 617, n.8 (1954); McCormick, Can the
Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official Investigations?, 42 IowA L. REv. 363
(1957). But see cases cited note 61 supra.
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In Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,63 the court, in admit-
ting a Bureau of Mines report based on an investigation of the
causes of an accident, said:
the making of such reports is, by command of Congress, part of the
"business" of the Bureau of Mines. The report was a record of an "occur-
ance" or "event" and it was required by act of Congress ...
The report is no less admissible because its contains conclusions of
experts based upon hearsay evidence as well as observation. These cir-
cumstances go to weight rather than admissibility.64
The court cited cases in which it had admitted medical reports and
said that "medical diagnosis is no less a matter of opinion based
upon observation and perhaps hearsay than this report of the
Bureau's investigation."65 Admissibility was based on the Federal
Business Records Act (patterned after the Model Act), although the
fact that the records were official government documents may have
provided an additional stamp of reliability. 6
In Kelly v. Wasserman17 the court admitted New York Depart-
ment of Welfare records containing memoranda of a telephone con-
versation and a face-to-face interview between a department em-
ployee and the defendant. The court noted that the records were
"required by law" to be kept and were made in the regular course
of business. Accordingly, admission was based on section 374-a of
the New York Civil Practice Act, (patterned after the Model Act).
The court also stated that the problem of identifying the voice over
the telephone did not affect admissibility, citing the portion of the
statute stating that "All other circumstances of the making of the
. . . record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or
maker," '8 go only to weight and not admissibility.
The Moran and Kelly cases, although in the minority, illustrate
a growing judicial recognition of the evidentiary value of business
63. 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
64. Id. at 473.
65. Ibid.
66. Official reports are admissible by statute in a number of states. There is
considerable variance in the form and substance of these statutes. See Commissioner's
Prefatory Note at 9A Urwonm LAws ANN. 331 (1957). The Us~om OmcrAL
REPORTS As EViDENCE Act § 1, currently adopted in six states (Idaho, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming), provides that "Written reports of findings
of fact made by officers of this state, on a matter within the scope of their duty as
defined by statute, shall, insofar as relevant, be admitted as evidence of the matters
stated therein." Also, see UmFovR RuL_ OF EVIDENcE 63(15), discussed at McCoa-
ivc § 294 at 617-18. The federal act provides that "Books or records of accounts
or minutes of proceedings of any department or agency of the United States shall be
admissible to prove the act, transaction or occurrence as a memorandum of which the
same were made or kept." 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1958). On official reports generally, see
McCoMINcE § 291.
67. 5 N.Y.2d 425, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1959).
68. Id. at 430, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 542. The court cited Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y.
124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), for the proposition that it is unnecessary for the entrant
of a record to appear as a witness when he had a duty to record the information in
the memorandum. But it ignored the holding in Johnson that the New York business
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records even when the sources of information are outside the re-
cording business.6 9 The courts did not treat the "first step" hearsay
records statute "was not intended to permit the receipt in evidence of entries based
upon voluntary hearsay statements made by third parties not engaged in the business
or under any duty in relation thereto." Id. at 128, 170 N.E. at 518.
In the Kelly case, since defendant's statements constituted an admission of a
party-opponent, the court might have dealt with the problem as one of double hear-
say, an applied the admissions exception in conjunction with the business records
exception.
Another example of a liberal approach to the problem of the admissibility of
official reports, but one which did not rest on the business records exception, is
Banford Trust Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Conn. 481, 129 Atl. 379 (1925). There
the court admitted the report of a city medical examiner which contained the
comment "suicide" on the statement of the cause of death. The court recognized
that this conclusion of the examiner was not founded "upon knowledge or informa-
tion peculiar to the medical profession, but upon external facts and circumstances,
and such as he would not be permitted to give in evidence were he called as a
witness." Id. at 487, 129 Adt. at 381. Nevertheless, the court admitted the report on
the ground that it was required by law to be recorded. The court expressed a realistic
attitude in stating that "We agree with Professor Wigmore's conclusion: 'It is sensible
to admit all such entries for what they may be worth; in controverted cases, other
evidence is usually available."' Id. at 487, 129 At. at 382. Professor McCormick
points out that Urnom R= oF EvNmcE 63(15) codifies the position taken by
the Banford court by allowing the judge to admit, "as exceptions to the hearsay rule,
reports and findings of officers, if the judge finds them to be within the scope of
duty and that it was the duty of the officer 'to investigate the facts ... and to
make findings and draw conclusions based on such investigations."' McCormick, Can
the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official Investigations?, 42 IowA L. Rv.
363, 368 (1957).
69. Other examples of reports somewhat analogous to credit reports which have
been admitted as business records are accountant's summaries and market reports.
In United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616
(1941), the court admitted charts containing material extracted from official tax
record books and company files. The court emphasized the fact that the information
was drawn from records in the custody of public officers and open for inspection to
all, saying that "there are numerous cases holding admissible on the testimony of a
supervising agent statements compiled from voluminous records according to a
method at once practicable and offering a reasonable guarantee of accuracy, even
though the supervisor had not examined such records himself." Id. at 269. The court
said that the supervising accountant's aides who compiled the information were
acting in the regular course of business. The work of the accountant's aides in this
case is similar to that of the credit reporter, since both deal with information relating
to another business and both make a value judgment as to what information will
be included in the summary or report. It is questionable whether records kept in
official custody are inherently more reliable than other business records, or whether
official custody insures more accurate reporting by the accountants in the Mortimer
case than is done by credit reporters acting in the regular course of their business.
Market reports from newspapers and trade journals are admissible to prove market
price under a separate exception to the hearsay rule. See Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1192
1926). These reports are admitted if it is shown that they are accepted by the trade
as reliable and trustworthy, "without requiring evidence of how the information
published ... [was] obtained." Mount Vernon Brewing Co. v. Teschner, 108 Md.
158, 168, 69 At. 702, 706 (1908). The reporting of market prices obtained from
large marketing centers may lend itself to a higher degree of accuracy and precision
than is possible in the reporting of credit information. Market price involves only
one objective fact, while credit reporting involves a variety of data and a certain
amount of subjective judgment. However, the basis for admitting market reports
in evidence-their reliability and acceptance by businessmen - would justify the
admission of credit reports in particular cases where the reports are shown to be
reliable.
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problem in either of these cases; in both, the fact that the record
was based on hearsay affected only weight and not admissibility.
Although the cases exhibiting the most liberal approach to the
business records problem have usually involved reports prepared
by government officials,7 ° this fact does not necessarily make these
reports more reliable than credit reports. The reason for which
official reports are deemed reliable-that they have been made by
an official who has a duty to investigate and make a report on which
official action will be based 7 1 -seems no more likely to insure re-
liability than those factors which make credit reports trustworthy:
a duty7 2 on the reporter to collect and report information on which
the credit agency stakes its reputation and on which businessmen
rely as a basis for commercial transactions involving large sums of
money.
The tendency in Moran and Kelly to break away from a strict
application of the hearsay rule is commendable. However, it would
be unfortunate if these cases were construed as interpreting the bus-
iness records exception to provide a cure-all for any kind of objec-
tionable information contained in a business record. A better ap-
proach is to leave to the trial court's discretion the question whether,
in each particular case, the "outside information" in the record is
unreliable evidence. The wholesale admission of evidence that may
be unreliable and misleading seems as unjustified as a wholesale
exclusion of evidence that may be reliable and useful in litigation.
3. The trial court's discretion. An approach that leaves the ques-
tion of admissibility of credit reports to the trial court's discretion
allows for the admission in evidence of reports shown to have been
prepared under conditions which insure the degree of reliability and
trustworthiness that the business records exception requires. 3 At
the same time, it provides the necessary flexibility for excluding
unreliable reports. This is the means of determining admissibility
suggested by the Uniform Act. 4
70. See authorities cited note 61 supra.
71. See McCowucx § 294.
72. In Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Fed. 10 (6th Cir. 1910), where a credit
report was admitted under the business records exception, the court, in pointing out
that the reporter had a duty to prepare the report, stated:
It is well settled ... that the duty thus discharged need not be imposed by
law. It is enough that the duty is recognized. The fact that the record is designed
for the use of all persons rightly interested in the subject, and that the success
of the business of supplying the information so obtained is dependent upon its
accuracy, cannot, we think, but enhance the obligation and sense of dutyinvolved.
Id. at 18.
73. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
74. The Uniform Act provides for the admission of regular entries if properly
identified, if it was the regular course of business to make the entry at or near the
time of the act, "and if, in the opinion of the court, the source of information,
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The judge should consider all the circumstances surrounding the
preparation of the report that relate to its reliability. Such factors
are the nature and number of sources from which the credit informa-
tion was obtained, whether the informant had first-hand knowledge,
whether the report is composed largely of objective fact or subjective
judgment, the qualifications of the reporter, and the inconvenience
that would result if all the persons having first hand knowledge
of the making of the report or its contents were required to testify.
The problem of producing sufficient preliminary proof of the
reliability of the report may be a difficult one. Of course, the major
obstacle arises in attempting to establish that the source of informa-
tion is an informant who had first-hand knowledge of the facts
contained in the report. Since the reports are offered as records of
the credit agency,75 this foundation testimony will be presented by
a representative of the agency, an individual not connected with the
person or business from which the information was obtained. How-
ever, in the case of ordinary business records, the preliminary proof
is presented by one who is connected with the business to which
the records relate and who is presumably in a position to establish
the fact of the first-hand knowledge of the informant. But as a basis
for insuring the reliability of the business record, this distinction is
not always a realistic one, since
In respect to a particular record, it may not be possible to prove specifi-
cally that [the witness presenting the preliminary proof knew that] the
particular informant observed the facts, or indeed who the informant was.
As evidence that he did, it will be prima facie sufficient to show that it
was someone's job, or his business duty in the firm's routine or system,
to observe them.76
If the foundation witness does not in fact know who the informant
was or whether he had first-hand knowledge, then the mere fact that
methods and time of preparation, were such as to justify admission." UNuoiRum
Busnmss REcoRDs As EvmEmcE AcT § 2.
In Henderson v. Zubik, 390 Pa. 521, 524, 136 A.2d 124, 126 (1957), the court
said that "it is clear that the legislature intended to grant to the trial court discre-
tionary power as to the admissibility of business records, provided, that they meet
the standards set forth in the [Uniform] act. .. ." In Morgan, The Law of Evidence,
1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 567 (1946), in the context of hospital records, it
is said that "obviously the provision requiring the court to be persuaded that the
sources of information, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify
admission puts a large measure of discretion in the court and warrants the imposition
of reasonable limitations."
75. See note 60 supra. Also, see Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Fed. 10 (6th
Cir. 1910), discussed at text accompanying note 45 supra, where preliminary proof
was established by the manager of the credit agency office from which the report
was issued.
76. McComamcK § 286 at 602. See Ferguson v. Atlanta Newspaper, Inc., 93 Ga.
App. 622, 92 S.E.2d 321 (1956), where a business record was admitted into evidence
although the preliminary witness could only testify that it was a regularly kept
record, and could not testify from his own knowledge that the record was accurate.
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this witness is associated with the business to which the record
relates only lends some credence to the proposition that the inform-
ant probably had first-hand knowledge. Since circumstantial evi-
dence of first-hand knowledge is deemed sufficient for the admission
of ordinary business records, lack of direct proof of personal knowl-
edge in the case of credit reports should not automatically exclude
these reports from evidence.
The basic purpose which the first-hand knowledge requirement is
designed to serve -insuring reliable evidence 77 can be achieved
by other means. One factor tending to establish reliability is that
the information in a given report was obtained from a number of
sources who supplied identical information.78 These various sources
serve as a check upon one another, and although this will not assure
that each informant had first-hand knowledge of the facts, it pro-
vides a reasonably effective means of culling out inaccuracies and
insuring.reliable information. It might also be shown in a given case
that the reporter in question was thoroughly acquainted with the
sources of information and was, thus, in a position to obtain informa-
tion from reliable sources who had first-hand knowledge.79 In addi-
tion, a showing might be made that a given report is the product of
two independent investigations by two reporters.8 0 A comparison of
results of concurrent investigations serves to disclose possible errors
of the reporters or inconsistencies in information received from par-
ticular informants.
IV. CONCLUSION
A greater evidentiary use can be made of credit reports when it
is recognized that the question of their admissibility involves a "two-
step" hearsay problem. In many cases, the "first step" of the prob-
lem can be resolved by a showing that the credit reporter could
properly testify as to matters contained in the report under some
exception to the hearsay rule. The business records exception is then
available as a means of resolving the "second step" hearsay problem
77. See McCoRwucr § 10 at 19, § 286 at 602.
78. See BECKmd" 167.
79. See notes 9 & 10 supra, and text accompanying note 12 supra. When such
a showing is made, reliance on the credit reporter to obtain information from in-
formed and trustworthy sources would seem as satisfactory as reliance on a prelimi-
nary witness connected with the business in the operation of which this information
was recorded when the witness can only testify that it was someone's duty to know
and record the information contained in the report.
Another factor encouraging accurate and honest disclosure to the reporter is that
misrepresentations as to financial condition are actionable by one who grants credit
in reliance on the representation. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 184 (1953).
80. Dun & Bradstreet traveling reporters sometimes check the accuracy of the
reports of local correspondents at periodic intervals or on special occasions. Also, two
local correspondents employed in the same territory sometimes are assigned the
same investigations without knowing of the duplication. BECm&AN 167.
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- substituting the report for the reporters testimony as a business
record of the credit agency.
However, even though an exception cannot be found to meet the
"first step" objection, a credit report should not be summarily ex-
cluded merely because it fails to fit within the scope of a mechanical
rule that does not take account of particular cases.8' Under modem
codifications of the business records exception, these reports should
be admitted when the trial court is satisfied by the preliminary proof
that they are in fact reliable.82
It has long been urged that the "dnd of evidence on which
responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs" s3
should not be excluded from consideration in the determination of
disputed facts in litigation."4 Since businessmen, courts, and com-
mentators have all recognized the reliability of credit reports, a
general categorization of these reports as inadmissible hearsay may
result in the exclusion of much reliable evidence.85
81. See 2 DAvis, An)imsTrvE Lw TRTISE § 14.10 at 295--96 (1958).
82. The Uniform Act specifically provides that the trial court is to determine
whether "the source of information, methods and time of preparation, [of the record]
were such as to justify its admission." See text accompanying note 42 supra.
83. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
304 U.S. 576 (1938).
84. See 2 DAvIS, op. cit supra note 82, at § 14.01; McConancK § 800-02; MoRGAN
51: "The adjudicated cases alone, without any independent investigation into current
systems of accounting, reveal the need for inducing the courts to give evidential
credit to the books upon which the mercantile and industrial world relies in the
conduct of business."
85. Consideration must be given to several factors that generally tend to cast
doubt on the reliability of credit reports. The credit agency does not usually guar-
antee to the subscriber the accuracy of the information contained in the reports,
although it is held to a duty of reasonable care absent an exculpatory clause in the
contract between agency and subscriber. 36 Am. Jun. Mercantile Agencies §§ 6, 7
(1941). However, the contract usually contains provisions protecting the agency from
liability arising from losses caused the subscriber through reliance on erroneous credit
reports. 1916 Ann. Cas. 747, 750. This exculpatory clause protects the agency from
acts of negligence, but not from gross negligence or false reports knowingly made.
Munro v. Bradstreet, 170 App. Div. 294, 155 N.Y. Supp. 833 (1915). Such contract
provisions are usually construed strictly against the agency, Crew v. Bradstreet
Co., 134 Pa. 161, 19 At!. 500 (1890), see Annot., 102 A.L.R. 1070 (1936), but they
have prevented recovery by an injured subscriber in several cases. See, e.g., Globe
Home Improvement Co. v. Perth Amboy Chamber of Comm. Rating Bureau, Inc.,
116 N.J.L. 168, 182 At. 641 (1936); Bauman v. Bradstreet Co., 288 App. Div. 617,
265 N.Y. Supp. 169 (1933). Although the enforcement of such provisions may appear
to be an undue hardship on subscribers, it must be remembered that credit agencies
do not undertake to sell credit insurance, but only credit information.
Credit agencies are liable for defamatory material that they publish, but a majority
of courts hold that a privilege exists as to information contained in credit reports.
E.g., Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 844 U.S. 821 (1952), Contra, Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co.,
25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007 (1914). The privilege does not apply to information
communicated to subscribers generally, Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100
Ark. 477, 140 S.W. 257 (1911), but only to information given in response to a
request of a subscriber, Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.
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1947), and information so given is usually conditional on the subscribers' agreement
to keep it in strict confidence. See IRONS & BELLmoRE 96.
The fact that credit agencies insulate themselves from liability by use of the
exculpatory clause and privilege may indicate a lack of confidence in the accuracy
of their reports which casts doubt on their reliability. However, questions of reliabil-
ity should not hinge on any one such general criticism of the evidence offered; this
insulation from liability should be only one factor to be considered by the court.
Such general criticisms do not answer particular questions about the reliability of
credit reports in particular cases.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., has indicated that it does not favor the use of its credit
reports as evidence except in cases where a subscriber has relied on a Dun & Brad-
street report to his detriment. Since credit information is obtained and disseminated
on the understanding that it will be kept in strict confidence, it is believed that the
use of the reports in litigation would weaken the trust and confidence upon which
credit reporting is based. Letter from Howard Kraetz, City Department, Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., to Minnesota Law Review. No reported case can be found where
this point has been discussed, but it is unlikely that courts would consider that the
confidential relationship upon which credit reports are based is worthy of protection
by a legally recognized evidentiary privilege. Most commentators believe that the
policy arguments in favor of getting all the facts before the court far outweigh the
reasons supporting the suppression of evidence under the privilege theory. See, e.g.,
McCoRMICx § 108. Of course, this factor cannot be summarily dismissed, but it
should be only one of the factors that the trial court considers in determining the
admissibility of a credit report. He must weigh the possible harm involved in disclos-
ing this information in court against the harm involved in suppressing relevant
evidence.
